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Nested Payment Intermediaries in the ACH Network:
Risks and Responsibilities of ODFIs
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid advancement of technology has stimulated innovation
in electronic payment methods, but it has also created more
opportunities for funds to be misappropriated and criminals to commit
fraud.1 Increasingly, perpetrators of payments fraud are taking
advantage of these technological developments to exploit customers,
corporations, and financial institutions.2 Over the past decade, thirdparty entities have become more involved in the electronic payment
sector by facilitating transactions between a customer and his bank.3
Moreover, as the number of these payment intermediaries4 increases,
the potential for fraud and error also escalates.5
In response to nationwide reports of payments fraud, the United
States Department of Justice (“DOJ”), Federal Trade Commission, and
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau commenced operations to
scrutinize the practices of banks and payment intermediaries.6 In 2013,

1. ASS’N FOR FIN. PROF’LS, PNC FIN. SERVS. GRP., 2016 AFP PAYMENT FRAUD AND
CONTROL SURVEY 1 (2016), https://www.pnc.com/content/dam/pnc/com/pdf/
corporateandinstitutional/Treasury%20Management/
2016_AFP_Payments_Fraud_Report.pdf.
2. Id.
3. Third-Party Sender Identification Tool, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/thirdparty-sender-identification-tool (last visited Jan 4, 2017).
4. A payment intermediary is an entity that performs some aspect of the payment
processing on behalf of a client. These entities enter into agreements with a bank, customer,
or another payment intermediary, assenting to aid in the processing of entries through the
Automated Clearing House electronic wire transfer system (“ACH Network”). Id.
5. See id. (explaining that with the proliferation of new payment models, there is an
indefinable amount of payment intermediary business-case scenarios, which obfuscate the
role of a financial institution involved in some aspect of ACH payment processing).
6. See Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Takes Action Against
Global Client Solutions for Processing Illegal Debt-Settlement Fees (Aug. 25, 2014), http://
www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-against-global-clientsolutions-for-processing-illegal-debt-settlement-fees/; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n,
FTC Settlements Crack Down on Payment Processing Operations that Enabled ‘Google
Money Tree’ Scammers to Charge Consumers $15 Million in Hidden Fees (Nov. 18, 2013),
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the DOJ launched “Operation Choke Point,” an investigatory initiative
aimed at penalizing third-party payment intermediaries and financial
institutions that help scammers steal payments from customers despite
clear evidence of fraud.7 Through this operation, the DOJ successfully
prosecuted the owner of Check Site, Inc., Neil Godfrey, for using his
third-party payment-intermediary company to help scammers steal
millions of dollars from consumers.8 While the results of many similar
investigations have been fruitful, the expansion of the third-party
payment intermediary sector continues to expose customers to new and
evolving threats of fraud.9
According to the 2016 Association for Financial Professionals’
Payments Fraud and Control Survey, 73% of finance professionals
reported that their companies experienced attempted or actual payments
fraud in 2015.10 Further, 25% of corporations reported an economic
loss caused directly by unauthorized or fraudulent transactions
facilitated through the Automated Clearing House (“ACH”).11 While
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/11/ftc-settlements-crack-downpayment-processing-operation-enabled; See also Managing Risks in Third-Party Payment
Processor Relationships, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (July, 2014), https://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/sisum11/managing.html (stating that federal
regulators advise financial institutions to have appropriate risk management and control
procedures to ensure compliance with federal regulation and project consumers against
payment fraud committed by third party intermediaries).
7. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CENTER, WHAT IS OPERATION CHOKE POINT 1 (2015),
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/banking_and_payment_systems/payment-fraud/
ib_what_is_operation_choke_point52815.pdf.
8. Press Release, U.S. DOJ, California Payment Processing Company Owner Pleads
Guilty (July 16, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/california-payment-processingcompany-operator-pleads-guilty-fraud (elucidating that Godfrey both aided scammers find
banks that were willing to ignore red flags and helped the fraudulent merchants stay off the
radar of other banks and regulators so that the fraud could continue).
9. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, supra note 6 (stating that Global Client Solutions had
paid $6 million to settle charges by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau from a claim
alleging that it violated the Telemarketing Sales Rule by making it possible for debtsettlement companies to charge consumers illegal fees upfront); Federal Trade Comm’n,
supra note 6 (disclosing that the Federal Trade Commission cracked down of Process
America, a third-party payment intermediary, which ignored plainly deceptive statements on
merchant’s websites that enabled ‘Google Money Tree’ scammers to steal $15 million from
consumers through unauthorized ACH entries).
10. ASS’N FOR FIN. PROF’LS, supra note 1, at 28 (detailing how “The Association for
Financial Professionals” conducts its yearly survey, which draws on the knowledge of
corporate practitioner members to provide fraud data analysis in the area of bank relation
management, risk management, payments and financial accounting reporting).
11. ASS’N FOR FIN. PROF’LS, supra note 1, at 4 (explaining that the ACH Network is a
batch processing system in which financial institutions electronically transfer funds through
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ACH transactions are generally considered to be a safe form of
payment, the increase of third-party senders (“Third-Party Senders”)12
has exposed financial institutions to a greater level of compliance,
credit, and legal risk.13 The increased risk comes coupled with
increased contention; when a financial institution or originator enter into
contracts with these third-party intermediaries instead of direct
agreements with each other, the responsibilities and potential liabilities
of each party becomes less clear.14 Even more troublesome, payment
intermediaries are choosing to originate ACH transactions for other
payment intermediaries, creating multiple, nested layers between a
customer and his bank.15 This “nesting” of third-party relationships
adds complexity to the ACH transaction and further augments the
potential for error and fraud.16
To help reduce the potential for payment fraud, the National
Automated Clearing House Association (“NACHA”)17 publishes
Operating Rules that provide the legal foundation for the ACH
electronic payment system (“ACH Newtork”).18 Since its inception,
NACHA has continually amended its Operating Rules in order to
debit or credit entries).
12. See Third-Party Senders, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/content/third-partysenders (last visited Feb. 7, 2007) (explaining how NACHA coins the term Third-Party
Senders as a type of third party payment intermediary).
13. See Linda McGlasson, ACH Fraud: Avoid 3rd-Party Risk, BANK INFO SEC. (June
22,
2010),
http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/ach-fraud-avoid-3rd-party-risks-a-2678
(illustrating a recent case in which a court analyzed the responsibilities of an ODFI when
contracting with Third-Party Senders).
14. See Clinton Plumbing & Heating of Trenton, Inc. v. Ciaccio, No. 09-2751, 2010
WL 4224473 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2010) (demonstrating the increase in error risks that occurs
when third parties enter the ACH Network).
15. NAT’L AUTOMATED CLEARING HOUSE ASS’N, THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES:
ODFI BEST PRACTICES TO CLOSE THE GAP AN ACH RISK MANAGEMENT WHITE PAPER 12
(2009) [hereinafter THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES], http://www.achthirdparty.com/
wp-content/uploads/2012/08/thirdpartysenderwhitepaper.pdf (explaining the complex web
of obligations and potential liabilities created by nesting payment intermediaries).
16. Id.
17. What is ACH?: Quick Facts About Automated Clearing House Network, NACHA
(Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.nacha.org/news/what-ach-quick-facts-about-automatedclearing-house-ach-network (stating that NACHA is a nonprofit association representing
nearly 11,000 financial institutions that the development, administration, and governance of
the ACH Network).
18. How the Rules Are Made, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/content/how-rules-aremade (last visited Jan. 4, 2017) (explaining that the Operating Rules define the roles and
responsibilities of financial institution members and establish clear guidelines for each
network participant in order to ensure millions of payments occur smoothly each day).
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improve the quality and efficiency of the ACH Network.19 Between
2013 and 2014, NACHA incorporated additional provisions to Article II
of the Operating Rules, which governs the potential liabilities of each
party to an ACH transaction.20 Notably, this recent amendment
concerned the obligations of an Originating Depository Financial
Institution (“ODFI”) when it originates ACH entries that are initiated by
a Third-Party Sender.21
Prior to this amendment, courts consistently found that an ODFI
is required to indemnify a Receiving Depository Financial Institution
(“RDFI”) from any claim resulting even remotely from a violation of
the warranty provisions.22 However, there is little case law that directly
examines how the recent amendments to the Operating Rules would
affect an ODFI’s obligations and potential liabilities when its
originating entries are initiated through a third-party intermediary.23
Though NACHA has reiterated that ODFIs bear the bulk of the risk
when originating ACH transactions, the issue becomes more nuanced
when “nested” third parties (“Nested-Third-Party Sender”)24 initiate
entries through ODFIs on behalf of originators with high return rates,
such as payday lenders.25
Id.
Id.
NAT’L AUTOMATED CLEARING HOUSE ASS’N, 2016 ACH RULES: A COMPLETE
GUIDE TO RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE ACH NETWORK, § 2 (2016) [hereinafter
NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016)]; see also NAT’L AUTOMATED CLEARING HOUSE ASS’N,
2016 ACH RULES: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE ACH
NETWORK, § 2 (2014) [hereinafter NACHA OPERATING RULES (2014)].
22. PFG Precious Metals, Inc. v. SunTrust Bank, No. 10 C 7709, 2012 WL 404187
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2012) (holding that the warranty provision required the ODFI to indemnify
the RDFI); Sec. First Network Bank v. C.A.P.S., Inc., No. 01 C 342, 2003 WL 22299011
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2003).
23. See NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.15.3 (delineating the
relationship between an ODFI and Third-Party Senders).
24. For purposes of this Note, Nested-Third-Party Sender shall include any entity
between an ODFI and an Originator, besides the Third-Party Sender with which it has an
operating agreement. See Third-Party Sender Registration Rule: Understanding the New
Rule & the Broader Business Context, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/events/repeatwebinar-understanding-third-party-sender-registration-rule-what-you-need-know
(last
visited Jan. 4, 2017) (elucidating the introduction of Nested-Third-Party Sender’s into the
ACH Network).
25. See Press Release, NACHA, ACH Operations Bulletin #2-2014: ACH Transactions
Involving Third-Party Senders and Other Payment Intermediaries (Dec. 30, 2014)
[hereinafter NACHA Bulletin 2-2014], https://www.nacha.org/news/ach-operationsbulletin-2-2014-ach-transactions-involving-third-party-senders-and-other-payment
(discussing a 2014 amendment to the definition of a Third-Party Sender and its implications
19.
20.
21.
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This Note analyzes the scope of an ODFI’s liability in instances
where a claim results from an ACH entry made through a Nested-ThirdParty Sender. Part II explains the typical parties to an ACH transaction
and provides examples to help illustrate the process.26 Part III examines
the additional risks involved when a Nested-Third-Party Sender initiates
an ACH entry.27 Part IV examines an ODFI’s role in mitigating the
risks associated with Third-Party Senders and discusses the implications
of NACHA’s new Third-Party Sender Registration Rule (effective
2017) on the risk mitigating duties of an ODFI.28
II. THE ACH TRANSACTION
The ACH Network moves money and information from an
account at one bank to an account at another bank through Direct
Deposit and Direct Payment.29 Each year, the ACH Network transmits
over $40 trillion in electronic financial transactions, and processes more
than 20% of the total electronic payments in the U.S.30 In order to
discern the risks associated with the influx of Nested-Third-Party
Senders into the ACH Network, it is important to understand the
different parties involved in a typical ACH transaction.
A.

Parties to the ACH Transaction

Within a typical ACH transaction, there are five parties
involved: (1) the originating company or individual (“Originator”); (2)

on financial institutions); Press Release, NACHA, ACH Operations Bulletin #1-2014:
Questionable ACH Debit Origination: Roles and Responsibilities of ODFIs and RDFIs
(Sept. 30, 2014) [hereinafter NACHA Bulletin #1-204], https://www.nacha.org/news/achoperations-bulletin-1-2014-questionable-ach-debit-origination-roles-and-responsibilities
(explaining that the highest risk-originators are those not engaged in legitimate business
practices which leads historic patterns of unauthorized returns); Devon Marsh,
Commentary: ACH Return Rates, and the Case for Transparency, NACHA (June 11, 2015),
https://www.nacha.org/news/commentary-ach-return-rates-and-case-transparency.
26. See infra Part II.
27. See infra Part III.
28. See infra Part IV.
29. Direct Deposit and Direct Payment via ACH, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/
payments (last visited Jan. 4, 2017).
30. History and Network Statistics, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/ach-network/
timeline (last visited Jan. 4, 2017).
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the ODFI; (3) the ACH Operator;31 (4) the RDFI; and (5) the receiving
company or individual (“Receiver”).32 For an ACH transaction to
occur, a Receiver must authorize an Originator to initiate the ACH entry
(credit or debit) to the Receiver’s account at the RDFI.33 The Originator
agrees to initiate the entry at his ODFI according to the arrangement
made with the Receiver.34 The ODFI receives payment instructions
from the Originator and forwards the entry to the ACH Operator, who
transmits the entry to the RDFI.35 After verifying that it holds the
account by checking the account and routing numbers on the
transmission, the RDFI posts the entry to the account of the Receiver.36
In a typical credit entry, the payor (Originator) initiates the entry
through its bank (ODFI), which electronically transfers money into the
payee’s (Receiver) bank account at the RDFI.37 In a typical debit entry,
the payee (Originator) initiates the entry through its bank (ODFI) by
requesting that funds be removed from the account of the payor
(Receiver) at the RDFI.38
To illustrate a credit entry, suppose Company A holds an
account with Bank of America and employs Employees B and C, who
hold bank accounts at TD Bank and Citibank respectively.39 Company
A does not want to pay its employees with paper checks every week, so
instead it asks Employee B and C to provide their bank account
numbers in order to direct deposit payroll into their accounts.
Employee B and C authorize Company A to initiate this credit entry by
31. An ACH Operator is a clearing facility, which receives and processes batches of
electronic ACH entries from ODFIs. THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at
4.
32. See THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 4 (explaining the
typical parties to an ACH transaction).
33. NACHA, supra note 17, at 4 (explaining how each ACH transaction is governed by
agreement, and discussing how the NACHA ACH Operator Rules binds each member bank
who must agree to in order to send and receive ACH entries).
34. NACHA, supra note 17, at 4.
35. NACHA, supra note 17, at 4.
36. NACHA, supra note 17, at 4.
37. KAREN FURST & DANIEL E. NOLLE, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY,
ACH PAYMENTS: CHANGING USER AND CHANGING USES 2 (Oct., 2005), https://
www.occ.treas.gov/topics/bank-operations/bit/ach-policy-paper-6.pdf.
38. Id.
39. Cf. Automated Clearing House Transactions: Overview, FED. FIN. INST.
COUNSEL,
http://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/pages_manual/
EXAMINATION
olm_059.htm (proving additional examples of the types of parties that typically engage in an
ACH transaction) (last visited January 4, 2017).
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providing their banking and routing numbers. Once Company A
(Originator) receives authorization, it initiates the ACH transactions by
providing Bank of America (ODFI) with Employee B and C’s
(Receivers) bank information and the amount which is owed to each.
Bank of America then submits this information to an ACH Operator,
which forwards the credit entry to TD Bank and Citibank (RDFIs). TD
Bank and Citibank verify that they hold the Employee B and C’s
account by authenticating the routing and account numbers on the entry,
and then credit that account in the amount transmitted from Bank of
America.
To demonstrate a debit entry, suppose student-payor (Receiver)
wants to make a payment to lender-payee (Originator) on his student
loans. Instead of sending a paper check to the lender to repay the
principal and interest on the loan each month, student provides the
lender with the routing and account number for his account at Bank of
America (RDFI) and authorizes a withdrawal of $100 on the first of
each month. Lender then provides the student’s bank information to TD
Bank (ODFI) and the amount that is owed to the lender. TD Bank then
submits this information to the ACH Operator, which forwards the debit
entry to Bank of America (RDFI). After verifying the account and
routing number, Bank of America (RDFI) debits student’s (Receiver)
account for $100.
B.

NACHA Rules Governing Dispute Resolution

Disputes typically arise when a customer (Receiver) reports an
unauthorized debit to his bank account.40 The Operating Rules state that
the Receiver must report unauthorized ACH debit transactions to the
RDFI within fifteen calendar days from the date the RDFI sends or
makes available to the Receiver information relating to the debit entry.41
If such a report is made, the RDFI is obligated to promptly credit the
amount of the debit entry.42 If a claim arises from a dispute as to the
authorization status of an ACH entry, an RDFI can typically rely on the
40. See ODFI Liability for Breach of Warranty, NACHA (Mar. 28, 2003), https://
www.nacha.org/news/odfi-liability-breach-warranty (illustrating that a customer begins the
dispute process by contesting a debit entry on his bank account).
41. NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21.
42. NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21.
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Operating Rules warranties to recover that amount from an ODFI.43
Under Article II of the Operating Rules, an ODFI sending an
entry to an RDFI warrants, among other things, that the entry: (1) is in
accordance with proper authorization provided by both the Receiver and
Originator; (2) is for an amount which on the settlement date will be due
and owing to the Originator from the Receiver or for a sum specified by
the Receiver to be paid to the Originator; and (3) contains the correct
account and routing number of the Receiver.44 If a claim against an
RDFI arises directly or indirectly from a breach of any of these
warranties, Article II of the Operating Rules requires the ODFI to
indemnify and defend the RDFI.45
For example, supposed in the student loan debit entry scenario
above, TD Bank erroneously submits the debit entry to Bank of
America a week too early; yet Bank of America is unaware of the
agreement between student and lender, so it debits student’s account for
$100 and returns the entry to TD Bank. A few days later, student
checks his bank account and it is $100 short so he requests that Bank of
America refund his account for the amount of the unauthorized
transaction. Because TD Bank warranted that on the settlement date the
entry was for an amount that was owed to lender from student, TD Bank
would be required to indemnify Bank of America if student brings a
claim for the loss of his $100 since it resulted from a breach of
Operating Rules warranties.46
Article II previously included a catchall provision, which
required an RDFI to indemnify an ODFI from any claim resulting from
“the debiting or crediting of the entry to a receivers account.”47 The
43. THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 6 (explaining that an
ODFI’s potential liability under the Rules for breach of warranty is not limited to the return
time frames, but is limited only by the statute of limitations for breach of contract claims
under the applicable state law; for example, the ODFI’s liability for a breach of warranty
exists for seven years in some states).
44. NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.4.
45. NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.4.5.1.
46. NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2. See Sec. First Network
Bank, Inc., No. 01 C 342, 2003 WL 22299011, at *21-22 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2003)
(demonstrating a similar situation in which the ODFI was required to indemnify the RDFI
for a breach of the NACHA warranties).
47. See NAT’L AUTOMATED CLEARING HOUSE ASS’N, 2013 ACH RULES: A COMPLETE
GUIDE TO RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE ACH NETWORK, § 2 (2013) (containing
no catchall provision); But see NAT’L AUTOMATED CLEARING HOUSE ASS’N, 2009 ACH
RULES: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE ACH NETWORK, §
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most recent amendment to Article II qualifies the catchall language by
including:
[T]he debiting or crediting . . . in accordance with the
terms of the Entry, including any claims, demands,
losses, liabilities, or expenses, and/or attorney’s fees and
costs that result, either directly or indirectly, from the
return of one or more items or Entries of the Receiver
due to insufficient funds caused by a Debit entry.48
The added qualifying language narrows the scope of claims for
which an ODFI must indemnify an RDFI by limiting an ODFI’s duty to
indemnify to only claims that arise from an RDFI’s actions that are in
accordance with “the terms of the entry.”49 Yet, the influx of ThirdParty Senders into the ACH Network has increased the potential for
error and dulled the precision of that qualification because the “terms of
the entry” are typically disputed when multiple layers exist between an
Originator and an ODFI.
C.

Regulatory Oversight

In addition to NACHA’s Operating Rules, state and federal
governments also promulgate regulations governing the roles and
responsibilities of parties using the electronic wire transfer system.50
The regulations under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (“Regulation
E”), The Banking Secrecy Act (“BSA”), and the Uniform Commercial
Code all regulate this sector by establishing the rights, liabilities, and
responsibilities of parties in electronic fund transfers.51 The focus of
these acts is to protect the rights of consumers who use the ACH
Network, requiring financial institutions to refund their customers’
accounts for unauthorized entries if timely notice is given.52
2 (2009) (containing the catchall provision).
48. NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.4.1.
49. NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.4.1.
50. See Raj Bhala, The Inverted Pyramid of Wire Transfer Law, 82 KY. L.J. 347, 364
(1994) (discussing the macroeconomic purpose of government fund transfer laws).
51. Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 12 C.F.R. § 205 (2016); Bank Secrecy
Act of 1970 § 202, 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2015); U.C.C. Article 4A (2012).
52. 12 C.F.R. § 205; 31 U.S.C § 5311; U.C.C. Article 4A.
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Furthermore, these laws establish the required procedures for resolving
account errors and disputes when the financial institution disagrees with
a consumer as to whether an error occurred.53
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”)
implements the regulations for the BSA, which are intended to deter and
detect the misuse of our nation’s financial institutions through fraud or
other criminal schemes.54 The regulations require every national bank
to have a system of internal controls monitoring its customers’ accounts
and to file suspicious activity reports when it detects any certain known
or suspected violations of federal law.55 Interestingly, the regulation
does not include a Third-Party Sender provision to outline the
responsibilities of financial institutions when these entities become
involved in an ACH transaction.56
To ensure that the Operating Rules comply with the federal
regulations, NACHA collaborates with multiple agencies such as the
Federal Reserve, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the United
States Department of Treasury, and the OCC.57 While NACHA assists
these regulatory agencies in protecting the interests of customers by
regularly responding to inquiries, it also aims “to protect[] the interests
of private sector rulemaking and network participants.”58 Moreover,
because federal law provides little insight into the obligations of
payment intermediaries in the ACH Network, NACHA’s Operating
Rules are the authoritative legal framework that governs the
relationships between these third-party entities and financial
institutions.59

53. 12 C.F.R. § 205; 31 U.S.C § 5311; U.C.C. Article 4A.
54. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 Regulations, 12 C.F.R § 21.11 (2016) (explaining that

regulation ensures that national banks file a Suspicious Activity Report when they detect a
known or suspected violation of Federal law or a suspicious transaction related to a money
laundering activity or a violation of the Bank Secrecy Act).
55. Id.
56. See id. (remaining silent on the roles and responsibilities of Third-Party Senders);
12 C.F.R § 205 (2016) (remaining silent on the roles and responsibilities of Third-Party
Senders).
57. Government Relations, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/content/government (last
visited Jan 4, 2017).
58. Id.
59. NACHA Bulletin 2-2014, supra note 25.
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III. PAYMENT INTERMEDIARIES AND RISK
The potential for misuse or fraud of the ACH Network exists in
all payment channels; however, the most problematic activity occurs in
the origination of ACH debits through third parties.60 The most
common risk is fraud, which arises frequently when an illicit
telemarketer or online merchant obtains the consumer’s account and
routing information through coercion or deception and initiates an
unauthorized ACH debit transfer.61 For example, one of the most
common types of ACH scam is fraudulent prizes or sweepstakes, where
scammers contact individuals informing them that they won a cash prize
and request their bank account information to complete the transfer.62
Another critical risk of third-party intermediaries is fund
misplacement, which can be further complicated by a third-party
intermediary declaring bankruptcy.63 The risks are exacerbated when
multiple layers of payment intermediaries nest between a customer and
his financial institution.64 Because each nested layer has access to the
customer’s routing and account information, there is greater potential
for the submission of unauthorized debit entries from accounts of
unwary customers.65 Once the funds are misplaced among layers of
nested third parties, the blame game begins.66

60. See Michael Bernard et al., Supervisory Insight, Managing Risks in Third-Party
Payment Processor Relationships, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (July 15, 2014), https://
www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/sisum11/managing.html
(elucidating that Third-Party payment intermediaries create the most risk for fraud and fund
misplacement in the ACH network).
61. Id.
62. Id. (explaining that common occurrences of fraud entail an illicit telemarketer or
online merchant contacting a consumer and obtaining his bank information to initiate an
fraudulent ACH entry under terms that are not fully understood by the consumer).
63. See Doug Walker, Release: Data Processing Services of Ga. Work with Federal
Authority After Problems with Deposits, ROME NEWS TRIBUNE (May 17, 2013), http://
www.northwestgeorgianews.com/rome/release-data-processing-services-of-ga-workingwith-federal-authorities/article_00319fb5-664b-55ea-a103-9099106a1b9f.html (providing
insight into the federal investigation of Data Processing Services of Georgia, a NestedThird-Party Sender that mishandled upwards of eight million dollars through the ACH
network, which resulted in multiple Third-Party Senders declaring bankruptcy).
64. THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 12.
65. THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 12.
66. See In re Payroll Am., Inc., 609 F.App’x 367, 368 (9th Cir. 2015) (exemplifying
the “blame game”, i.e., when a third party service provider declares bankruptcy after
debiting millions of dollars from employers accounts).
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Payment Intermediaries

A payment intermediary is an entity like a Third-Party Sender
which Originators and/or ODFIs use for outsourcing payment services
(See Figure A).67 The NACHA definition of a Third-Party Sender
focuses on two fundamental characteristics of the Third-Party Sender’s
relationship with Originators and ODFIs: (1) the Third-Party Sender
acts as an intermediary between the Originator and the ODFI; and (2)
the Third-Party Sender (rather than the Originator) has the agreement
(“Origination Agreement”) with the ODFI.68

Figure A69

Increasingly, financial institutions are entering into depository
relationships with payment intermediaries because they can earn
attractive transaction fees.70 Yet, the additional income comes at a cost;
financial institutions that allow Third-Party Senders to establish deposit
relationships for the purposes of processing transactions may find that
these relationships expose the institutions to a greater level of risk and
potential liability.71 The heightened exposure derives from the riskiness
67. PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, INFORMATION SUPPLEMENT: THIRD PARTY
SECURITY ASSURANCE 4 (2014), https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/
PCI_DSS_V3.0_Third_Party_Security_Assurance.pdf (defining Third-Party Sender and
providing numerous examples of entities that act in the role).
68. THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 4.
69. THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 5 (denoting diagram as
Figure A).
70. Bernard et al., supra note 60.
71. JILL FOREST, 2015 NACHA RULES, SAME DAY ACH AND REGULATION E CHANGES,
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of the Third-Party Sender’s clients, because the ODFI may initiate ACH
entries for clients that engage in deceptive, abusive, or illegal
practices.72 Moreover, financial institutions that enter into agreements
with Third-Party Senders may be viewed as facilitating practices of the
Third-Party Sender’s clients and could potentially be liable to an RDFI
whose customer reports an unauthorized transaction on his bank
account.73
One of the most common types of Third-Party Sender is a
payroll company.74 Typically, a payroll company enters into an
originating agreement with an ODFI, which allows the Third-Party
sender to initiate ACH entries on behalf of the financial institution.75
When an employer contracts with a payroll company to complete its
ACH credits to employees, the underlying transaction is generally split
into two related ACH entries: (1) the payroll processor initiates an
ACH debit to obtain payroll funds from the employer; and (2) the
payroll processor initiates an ACH credit to complete the payment to the
employee on behalf of the employer.76 For instance, if a company
(Originator) hires a payroll company (Third-Party Sender) to do its
weekly payroll, the company would authorize the payroll company to
complete two separate transactions: (1) to initiate an ACH debit entry
from the company’s account; and (2) to initiate an ACH credit entry to
the employees’ accounts.77
Where the primary relationship is unclear and there is a dispute
as to the authorization status of an entry, the responsibilities of the
Originator, ODFI, and RDFI become muddled.78 If the payment
intermediary is visible only to one party, it is clear that the intermediary
acts on behalf of that party.79 Yet, other circumstances necessitate a
deeper inquiry into intermediaries’ relationships to confirm its role,

THE CLEARING HOUSE PAYMENTS ASS’N 6 (2015), http://www.nyba.com/wp-content/
uploads/2015/05/CS6_NACHA_Rules.pdf.
72. Id. at 20.
73. McGlasson, supra note 13 (discussing a 2014 amendment to the definition of a
Third-Party sender and its implications on financial institutions).
74. THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 9.
75. NACHA Bulletin 2-2014, supra note 25.
76. NACHA Bulletin 2-2014, supra note 25.
77. NACHA Bulletin 2-2014, supra note 25.
78. NACHA Bulletin 1-2014, supra note 25.
79. NACHA Bulletin 1-2014, supra note 25.
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including its activities in obtaining authorizations from different
parties.80 A recent amendment to the NACHA Operating Rule clarifies
the more opaque relationship by outlining the obligations of a ThirdParty Sender.81
B.

The Obligations of a Third-Party Sender

In 2014, NACHA incorporated a new rule that defines the
obligations of Third-Party Senders, ODFIs, and Originators that use
Third-Party Senders.82 Under Operating Rule § 2.15.2, a Third-Party
Sender warrants “the authorization of each entry it originates through
the ODFI and agrees to indemnify the ODFI from and against any
claims, demands, losses, liabilities and expenses that result directly or
indirectly from the failure of the Originator to perform its obligations as
an Originator under these rules.”83 Further, under Operating Rule §
2.15.3, “a Third-Party Sender that is performing any of the obligations
of an ODFI warrants that it is legally able to perform the requirements
otherwise applicable to an ODFI.”84 However, the Third-Party Sender’s
performance of any of the obligations of an ODFI does not relieve the
ODFI of any of its obligations under the Operating Rules.85
The overlap of responsibility is where the “blame game”
remains.86 Suppose that (1) a Third-Party Sender submits an entry on
behalf of an ODFI and the authorization status of that entry is disputed;
or (2) a Third-Party Sender declares bankruptcy while in the process of
transmitting an entry to a Receiver’s account.87 With the proliferation
of payment intermediaries, the possibility of a claim that fits into one of
these areas of uncertainty increases.88 In the first instance, because both
NACHA Bulletin 2-2014, supra note 25.
NACHA, supra note 3.
NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.15.2.
NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.15.2.
NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.15.3.
NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.15.3.
See In re Payroll Am., Inc., 609 F.App’x 367, 368 (9th Cir. 2015) (exemplifying
the “blame game”, i.e., when a third party service provider declares bankruptcy after
debiting millions of dollars from employers accounts).
87. Id. (providing an example of this occurrence).
88. Joan Goodchild, ACH Fraud: Why Criminals Love This Crime, CSO ONLINE
(Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2125833/malware-cybercrime/achfraud—why-criminals-love-this-con.html.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
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the ODFI and Third-Party Sender have warranted that the ACH entry
was authorized, the Third-Party Sender will need to indemnify the
ODFI, who in turn will need to indemnify the RDFI against any claim
brought by a Receiver.89 However, when the parties dispute the “terms
of the entry,” the resulting liabilities are unclear. Under (2), if a ThirdParty Sender declares bankruptcy in the process of disputing the “terms
of an entry,” a court may still find an ODFI liable to an RDFI regardless
of the ODFIs operating agreement with the Third-Party Sender.90
C.

Nesting Third-Party Senders

The transaction between an Originator, Third-Party Sender, and
an ODFI becomes even more complicated when two or more additional
payment intermediaries nest.91 A Nested Third-Party Sender is any
entity whose services are contracted by another Third-Party Sender.92
For instance, this might occur when a smaller payroll company
contracts with a larger payroll company that has a better relationship
with an ODFI and can more efficiently process the smaller payroll
company’s ACH entries.93 Moreover, when there are multiple nested
third parties, the responsibilities and potential liability of the ODFI and
RDFI are even less clear.94
To illustrate, suppose aforementioned Payroll Company B
(Third-Party Sender) has an agreement with Payroll Company C
(Nested Third-Party Sender), who in turn has a depository agreement
with an ODFI.95 The relationship and potential liabilities between
Payroll Company B and ODFI are still unclear under Operating Rule §
2.15.3.96 If the ODFI terminated its relationship with Payroll Company
C, all parties to that transaction—Payroll Company B, all of its clients,

Id.
Id.
PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, supra note 67, at 23.
PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, supra note 67, at 2.
PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, supra note 67, at 4.
THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 9.
See NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.15.3 (requiring the
Third-Party Sender to warrant that it can legally perform the requirements otherwise
applicable to the ODFI, such as warranting the authorization of ACH entries submitted to
RDFIs).
96. NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.15.3.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
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and its clients’ employees—are impacted.97 In these situations, a ThirdParty Sender like Payroll Company B will be unable to complete the
second stage of its clients’ companies’ ACH entries (the credit
transaction), which will likely result in a loss of funds for the client’s
employees.98 Due to the lack of regulation and case law governing the
relationship between Nested-Third-Party Senders, payroll companies in
this situation generally are unsure of their potential liabilities to their
clients companies.99
D.

Case Law Demonstrating the Increased Risk of Nested-ThirdParty Senders

The federal courts have not made a direct ruling on the proper
allocation of risk created by payment intermediaries; yet, the 9th Circuit
affirmed the U.S. District Court of Idaho’s ruling which suggested that
even if the Third-Party Sender is acting on behalf of the Originator, the
ODFI should bear the bulk of the risk resulting from its involvement
with a particular ACH transaction.100 While the new rule requires a
Third-Party Sender to indemnify an ODFI for submitting an
unauthorized entry, the question still remains as to the obligations of
Nested-Third-Party Senders to other participants in the ACH
Network.101 This issue would arise when there is a factual dispute as to
the authorization status of an entry initiated by a Nested-Third-Party
97. See In re Payroll Am., Inc., 609 F.App’x 367, 369 (9th Cir. 2015) (demonstrating
the situation in which a Third-Party Sender is unable to complete its clients’ companies’
ACH entries).
98. Id.
99. See THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 9 (discussing the risks
associated when terminating relationships with Nested-Third-Party Senders).
100. In re Payroll Am., Inc., 609 F.App’x at 369 (affirming the ruling of the lower
court); Gugino v. Greater Rome Bank, 489 B.R. 252, at 257 (D. Idaho 2013) (ruling that, in
a bankruptcy proceedings, an ODFI was not liable to a client of a third-party sender that
initiated ACH transactions through the ODFI because the client failed to demonstrate either
that (1) the ODFI had dominion over the money transferred through the ACH Network; (2)
the ODFI was not an entity for whose benefit the ACH transactions were made; and (3) the
ODFI was not a subsequent transferee); See also Clinton Plumbing & Heating of Trenton,
Inc. v. Ciaccio, No. 09-2751, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113215, at *28–34 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22,
2010) (District Court of Pennsylvania finding that a claim against an RDFI resulting even
remotely from an ODFI’s alleged breach of warranty would permit the RDFI to bring a
third-party indemnification claim).
101. See THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 9 (providing a case
study dealing with a Nested-Third-Party Sender).
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Sender who has no direct contractual relationship with the Originator or
Receiver.102
In Gugino v. Greater Rome Bank,103 the Idaho District Court
analyzed the relationships between Originators and Nested-Third-Party
Senders in a bankruptcy proceeding.104 There, Payroll America, Inc., a
local payroll processing company, collected money from its employer
clients (Originators) and used that money to pay both the employee
salaries and applicable taxing authorities.105 Payroll America (ThirdParty Sender) contracted with Data Processing Services (“DPS”)
(Nested-Third-Party Sender) to process its electronic transmissions
through the ACH Network.106 DPS entered into an originating
agreement with Greater Rome Bank (ODFI), who in turn had an
agreement with the Federal Reserve Bank for clearing and transmitting
ACH entries.107 At some point, Payroll America misappropriated
monies that had been held to pay its customers’ future tax bills and
subsequently filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy.108 The Chapter 7 trustee
brought a claim against Greater Rome Bank (ODFI) contending that
Payroll America fraudulently transferred over $30 million to Greater
Rome before filing bankruptcy.109 Ultimately, the court dismissed the
claim against Greater Rome, ruling that its agreement with DPS
(Nested-Third-Party Sender) did not establish liability to Payroll
America’s (Third-Party Sender) clients (Originator).110 While this
decision ruled that, in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding, an ODFI
is not liable to an Originator whose funds are misappropriated by a
Nested-Third-Party Intermediary, there is still uncertainty as to the
ODFI’s potential liability to the Receiver and RDFI when a NestedThird-Party Sender initiates entries.111

Bernard et al., supra note 60.
489 B.R. 252.
Gugino, 489 B.R. at 255.
Id.
Id. at 255–256.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 255.
Id.
THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 9 (discussing the risks
associated when terminating relationships with Nested-Third-Party Senders).
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
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IV. ODFI’S DUTY TO MITIGATE RISK
In order to prevent these types of cases from arising, NACHA
promulgated three new Operating Rules that require ODFI’s to mitigate
the risks of Third-Party Senders.112 Now, ODFIs must: (1) enter into
Originating Agreements with Third-Party Senders, which among other
things allows the ODFI to audit the entity and its Originator’s
compliance with the Rules;113 (2) utilize a commercially reasonable
method to verify the identity of the Originator or Third-Party Sender at
the time the ODFI enters into the Originating Agreement;114 and (3)
perform due diligence with respect to the Third-Party Sender or
Originator to form a reasonable belief that the entity has the capacity to
perform its obligations under the Rules.115 Additionally, the new
Operating Rules requires ODFIs to periodically review the activities of
their Third-Party Senders, specifically monitoring the return rate for
unauthorized transactions.116
While these rules do encourage a more efficient ACH network,
they do not regulate the relationships between Third-Party Senders and
Nested-Third-Party Senders.117 NACHA’s Bulletin seems to suggest
that ODFIs should still bear the increased risk of these relationships
because they are in the best position to monitor against potential
fraud.118 Moreover, ODFIs are free to contract and collect fees with any
third-party payment intermediary it chooses, but by doing so they
should be prepared to assume the risks of fraud and error arising out of
those agreements.119
A.

New NACHA Rule Requiring Third-Party Sender Registration

Effective September 9, 2017, NACHA’s new Operating Rule
will require ODFIs to identify and register their Third-Party Sender

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.
NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.2.2.2.
NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.2.1.
NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.2.3.
NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.2.3.
See NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.2.3.
THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 12.
FOREST, supra note 71, at 25.
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customers in order to promote consistent due diligence and improve the
quality of the ACH Network.120 As an initial registration, ODFIs must
provide NACHA with basic registration information for each ThirdParty Sender customer, including: (1) ODFIs name and contact
information; (2) the name and principal place of business of the ThirdParty Sender; (3) the routing number used in ACH transaction initiated
by the Third-Party Sender; and (4) the company’s identification(s) of
the Third-Party Sender.121 The new Operating Rule also provides for a
supplemental registration requirement, which requires an ODFI to
provide more specific information about a Third-Party Sender within
ten days of an authorized request by NACHA.122 A request for
supplemental registration is authorized if NACHA believes that the
Third-Party Sender poses an escalated risk of financial loss to ACH
participants, a violation of the Operating Rules, or an excessive return
rate of unauthorized entries.123
Notably, the new Operating Rule requires a Third-Party Sender
to disclose to the ODFI any Nested-Third-Party Senders for which it
transmits entries to the ODFI, prior to transmitting any entries for other
Third-Party Senders.124 Moreover, a Third-Party Sender must provide
the ODFI, upon request, the information necessary for the ODFI to
complete registration for the Nested-Third-Party Sender within two
banking days.125 Still, it is uncertain whether an ODFI’s notice of its
relationship with a Nested-Third-Party Sender impacts its potential
liabilities to other participants in the ACH Network.126 Overall, this
new rule supports the notion that the most substantial obligation to
prevent against fraud falls on the ODFI, but it does not go as far as
requiring direct agreements between ODFIs and Nested-Third-Party
Senders.127

120. Third-Party Sender Registration, NACHA (2016), https://www.nacha.org/rules/
third-party-sender-registration (last visited February 7, 2017).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See id. (remaining silent as to whether notice of a Nested-Third-Party Sender
relationship impacts an ODFI’s potential liability).
127. Id.
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ODFI’s Capacity to Prevent Against Fraud in the ACH Network

An ODFI must deal directly with the Third-Party Sender before
any ACH transaction is to be initiated.128 Before agreeing to initiate a
transaction on behalf of a Third-Party Sender, NACHA’s new
Operating Rule will require ODFIs to identify and register the entity.129
During this registration period, an ODFI has the opportunity to assess
the risk of the relationship with the Third-Party and verify the
creditworthiness of this entity, including: (1) reviewing its financial
history; (2) ensuring it has sufficient capitalization in relation to the
volume of ACH transactions; (3) obtaining history of its ACH return
rates; and (4) researching consumer complaints on the Better Business
Bureau.130 While the Operating Rule does not require ODFIs to
examine Nested-Third-Party Senders with same degree of scrutiny,
ODFIs should go beyond the Rule’s requirements and employ the same
investigatory mechanisms to evaluate Nested Third Parties in order to
alleviate their potential exposure.131
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation published a
“Supervisory Approach to Institutions Establishing Account
Relationships with Third-Party Senders,” which sets forth a list of
specific risks that financial institutions should recognize and mitigate:
(1) credit risks (charge back from unauthorized transactions); (2)
operational risks; (3) compliance risks; (4) reputational risks; and (5)
legal risks (class action lawsuits).132 Though this list sets forth a “best
practice” for financial institutions, courts will likely consider this as
evidence weighing against an ODFI if ever a claim resulted from an
erroneous ACH transaction.133
On the one hand, NACHA should require ODFIs to consider the
128. See id. (explaining the relationship between the ODFI a Third-Party Sender and
discussing how the 2013 amendment requires transparency between the two parties).
129. Id.
130. THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 11; Third-Party Payment
Processors—Overview, FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNSEL, https://www.ffiec.gov/
bsa_aml_infobase/pages_manual/OLM_063.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2017).
131. FOREST, supra note 71, at 26 (providing methods for an ODFI to alleviate potential
exposure).
132. Bernard et al., supra note 60.
133. See THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 11 (discussing the
responsibilities of ODFIs when entering into operating agreements with Third Party Service
Providers).
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impact to all ACH participants when determining whether to enter or
terminate a depository agreement with a third-party-payment
intermediary, particularly because ODFIs typically make a profit on
these transactions.134 On the other hand, it may be unfair to require an
ODFI to incur liability for unauthorized transactions initiated by
Nested-Third-Party Senders with which the ODFI does not have an
operating agreement.135 A possible solution to minimize the risk of
Nested-Third-Party Senders could be a requirement that ODFIs must
always have a direct originating agreement between it and any ThirdParty Senders for which it originates entries.136 This requirement would
minimize the risk of default or misallocation of funds that each nestedthird-party intermediary places on all ACH participants.137 Still, even
without this requirement, ODFIs will be given notice of each NestedThird-Party Sender through its agreements with a Third-Party Sender.
Therefore, ODFIs can better serve their customers by applying the same
rigorous investigatory standards before originating ACH entries on
behalf of a Nested-Third-Party Sender.
C.

RDFIs Incur the Bulk of Expenses for Unauthorized Entries

For each returned unauthorized ACH entry, the RDFI incurs
considerable cost.138 NACHA collected cost data from twenty-nine
institutions that represent 82% of all ACH Network unauthorized
returns in a year and found that the weighted average cost for RDFIs to
handle unauthorized transactions was $5.97.139 However, the cost
drastically fluctuated depending on the size of the RDFI, ranging from
$1,800 per unauthorized transaction for a small RDFI to $2.30 for a
large RDFI. 140 NACHA Operating Rules currently require an ODFI to
pay a fee of less than $5.97 to an RDFI for any ACH debit returned as
THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 12.
FOREST, supra note 71, at 23.
FOREST, supra note 71, at 25.
THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 12–14.
FOREST, supra note 71, at 4.
FOREST, supra note 71, at 23 (explaining that the costs included labor, systems, and
office space allocations but did not take into consideration cost related to customer contact
via branch, compliance related to Reg. E disputes, and costs associated with obtaining a
Written Statement of Unauthorized Debit).
140. FOREST, supra note 71, at 23.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
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unauthorized.141 While the reimbursement fee is aimed at helping
RDFIs with a portion of the compensation for unauthorized entries, it is
clear that smaller institutions are most negatively impacted by an
ODFI’s lack of due diligence.142
If ODFIs were required to fully indemnify an RDFI for all
claims and damages resulting from contested or unauthorized ACH
Entries, ODFIs would be incentivized to implement strict screening
before entering into agreements with Third-Party Senders (and
potential, hidden Nested-Third-Party Senders).143 Furthermore, a
stricter screening policy would promote a more efficient ACH Network
for all parties, thereby increasing both customer and merchant
satisfaction.144 Last, because a financial institution will typically
participate in the ACH Network as an ODFI in one ACH entry and an
RDFI in another, it is in the interests of all NACHA members to require
implementation of a risk management system by the ODFI to protect
against fraudulent entries submitted by Third-Party Senders.145
V. CONCLUSION
The new Operating Rule governing Third-Party Sender
registration will likely reduce the occurrences of fraud by requiring
transparency for all Third-Party Senders between an ODFI and
Originator. Yet, it is still unclear as to whether Operating Rule § 2.2.2.2
would impose liability on an ODFI in the event that its contracted
Third-Party Sender—or even a Nested-Third-Party Sender—commits
fraud, misplaces funds, or declares bankruptcy. The Gugino case
appears to reject this theory of liability in a bankruptcy proceeding, yet
this decision is narrow and came down prior to the recent rule
amendment.146 For judicial clarity, ACH participants will likely need to
FOREST, supra note 71, at 23.
FOREST, supra note 71, at 23.
See FOREST, supra note 71, at 19–23 (discussing methods to improve the ACH
Network, including strict screening of Third-Party Sender’s by the ODFI).
144. NACHA, supra note 23 (explaining the National Automatic Clearing House
Association’s view on the risk of accepting originating ACH transactions from Third
Parties).
145. PETE MARTINO, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP, ACH AND THIRD-PARTY PAYMENT
PROCESSOR RELATIONSHIPS 18 (2014), https://www.kansascityfed.org/eventinfo/banking/
2014-AML-Third-Party%20Payment%20Processors%20and%20ACH%20Presentation.pdf.
146. Gugino v. Greater Rome Bank, 489 B.R. 252, at 257 (D. Idaho 2013).
141.
142.
143.
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wait for a direct opinion on the issue that firmly defines the limits of
liability in these situations. Overall, financial institutions should
continue to take steps to protect consumers against the risk of nested
payment intermediaries by strictly scrutinizing any ACH entry initiated
by a Third-Party Sender.
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